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How the “Exception” Becomes the Standard
By MARGEAUX BERGMAN ∗

I. INTRODUCTION
The late Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg once said,
“Women belong in all places where decisions are being made . . . It
shouldn’t be that women are the exception.” 1 The only way our
society can benefit from the experience, insights, and intellect of all
humanity is through the equal participation of women, which is
“vital to stability, helps prevent conflict, and promotes sustainable,
inclusive development. 2 Our institutions maintain a layer of
inequality based on the needs of one gender. Caroline Criado Perez
calls this “‘default man’ thinking: The unquestioned assumption that
men are standard, and women the exception.” 3
Female
representation on corporate boards is but one example of a case in
which “men are the standard, and women the exception.” 4 Equitable
gender representation has recently developed into a sizeable issue of
concern for corporate boards. Studies demonstrate various benefits
experienced by corporations as a result of having more diverse
boards of directors.
This, combined with pressures from
stakeholders, has led to slight increases in corporate board diversity,
but boards have been generally slow to diversify. A number of policy
solutions have been put forward to further advance gender equity on
corporate boards, including the use of shareholder derivative actions
for breach of fiduciary duty if the board fails to diversify as well as
states’ adoption of gender quota laws; these solutions have had little
traction, calling for the creation of new methods.
J.D. Candidate 2021, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A., University of
Kansas.
1. Mary Kate Cary, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Experience Shows the Supreme Court Needs
More Women, U.S. NEWS (May 20, 2009), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/mary-katecary/2009/05/20/ruth-bader-ginsburgs-experience-shows-the-supreme-court-needs-more-women.
2. Press Release, U.N. Secretary-General, Twenty-first Century Must Be Century of
Women’s Equality, Secretary-General Says in Remarks at The New School (Feb. 27, 2020).
3. Id.
4. Id.
∗
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This article argues in favor of an alternative approach, promoting
gender diversification of corporate boards through the proxy process
and other corporate governance tools at shareholders’ disposal,
rather than through externally imposed requirements or litigation.
The proxy process provides a forum in which shareholders may cause
meaningful change to the company. Shareholders should take
advantage of this medium to nominate director candidates to
diversify boards, compel companies to have board members commit
to more equitable gender representation, and submit proposals
recommending the adoption and implementation of policies
promoting gender equity. Notably, these recommendations transect
with current discourse regarding the shareholder voice in the proxy
process, illustrating the importance of robust shareholder access to
the proxy.
This article proceeds as follows. Part II details the challenge of
achieving gender parity on corporate boards by presenting historical
data on the lack of female representation. Part III acknowledges the
mixed findings of board gender diversity and firm performance, but
then emphasizes why the positive correlations are determinative and
of particular importance to companies. Part IV reviews the range of
externally imposed policy solutions to improve female board
representation, including disclosure requirements, shareholder
derivative suits, regulation, and legislation, and highlights the
limitations associated with these tactics. Part V puts forth an
alternative approach to increase gender diversity on corporate boards
and encourages the use of various tools available to shareholders,
including active shareholder participation in the director nomination
process, and the use of institutional investors to place external
pressures on companies to increase female representation and
achieve gender parity. This article asserts that increased shareholder
participation in the director nomination process and the utilization of
other mechanisms available to shareholders, including institutional
investors placing pressures on companies to diversify or
recommending the adoption of provisions such as the Rooney Rule,
are long-term, effective strategies that will increase female
representation on corporate boards.

II. HISTORICAL DATA AND STATISTICS
DEMONSTRATE THE LACK OF BOARD GENDER
DIVERSITY
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Now more than ever, stakeholders are advocating for gender
parity on corporate boards; while the industry has taken steps
towards realizing gender parity, the data exemplifies the fact that
boards have been slow to diversify. This intractable problem has
been an issue for decades, emphasizing the need for alternative policy
solutions to address the issues of equitable gender representation. In
1993, 69% of Fortune 500 companies maintained at least one woman
on their board, and in 1998, that percentage increased to 86%. 5 At
first glance, this 17% increase appears to be a sign of significant
change, but a more accurate depiction of the progress public
companies have made in regard to increasing female representation
quantify the percentage of board seats held by women. In 1993,
women held 8.3% of all Fortune 500 board seats; 6 in 1998, this statistic
rose to 11.1%. 7 By 2010, the percentage of Fortune 500 company
board seats held by women had only risen to 15.7%. 8 These numbers
began to rise in 2018, due in large part to a combination of factors
including the #MeToo movement and the passage of state legislation,
such as Senate Bill 826. In 2018, 22.5% of Fortune 500 companies’
board seats were held by women, 9 and in 2019, that number rose to
25.5%. 10 This 3% increase over the course of one year, compared to
the 4.6% increase that took place between 1998 and 2010,
demonstrates just how impactful the #MeToo movement and state
legislation was in 2018. However, these advances still leave women
grossly underrepresented in the boardroom, begging the question of
how further progress can be made. What is even more demonstrative
of society’s appetite for change is the increase in percentage of new
directors that are women. The total number of women holding new

5. 1995 Catalyst Census: Female Board Directors of the Fortune 500, CATALYST 1, 3
(1995); 1998 Catalyst Census: Women Board Directors of the Fortune 500, CATALYST 1, 5 (1998).
6. Id. at 7.
7. Id. at 2.
8. 2010 Catalyst Census: Fortune 500 Women Board Directors, CATALYST 1, 2 (2010).
9. Quick Take: Women on Corporate Boards, CATALYST (Mar. 13, 2020),
https://www.catalyst.org/research/women-on-corporate-boards/.
10. Courtney Connley, The number of women running Fortune 500 companies is at a record
high, CNBC MAKE IT (May 16, 2019, 12:30 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/16/the-numberof-women-running-fortune-500-companies-is-at-a-record-high.html.
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board positions at Russell 3000 companies rose from 12% in 2008 to
45% in 2019. 11
The data clearly demonstrates that while public companies are
moving in the right direction, it has been a slow, gradual process.
Additionally, review of the statistics may lead one to assume that, in
response to pressures from various stakeholders and in some
instances to be in compliance with recently passed state legislation,
public corporations have added a “token” woman to their boards of
directors and have not adequately addressed the issue of genderdiversity on corporate boards. In light of evidence on the benefits of
diversity experienced by companies, it is difficult to explain the
hesitation in transitioning to more diversified boards. These statistics
demonstrate that, while the diversification of corporate boards
provides equal opportunity to historically marginalized individuals
previously excluded from such positions of power, the corporate
community’s motivations in pursuing diversity-related measures is
prompted by much more than a moral obligation to redress past
discriminatory acts and behaviors. 12 With shareholder value serving
as the main objective in most, if not all, corporate decisions, the
business case for diversity may hold more sway. The next section
presents this evidence.

III. STUDIES SUGGEST CORPORATIONS BENEFIT
FROM FEMALE REPRESENTATION ON CORPORATE
BOARDS
Evidence that increased female representation on corporate
boards positively affects company performance and shareholder
value is mixed; some studies found negative correlations or no
correlation between board diversity and firm performance, while
others found positive correlations. Though the evidence that
increased gender representation on corporate boards positively
correlates to firm performance is unclear, what is clear is that board
diversity leads to other outcomes, which are known to lead to good
financial performance and increased shareholder value. First, this
11. Subdodh Mishra, U.S. Board Diversity Trends in 2019, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (June 18, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/06/18/u-s-board-diversitytrends-in-2019/.
12. Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bottom Line on Board Diversity: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the
Business Rationales for Diversity on Corporate Boards, WISC. L. REV., 795, 804, (2005).
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section will acknowledge a sample of studies that found a negative
correlation or no correlation, between board diversity and firm
performance. Second, this section will review studies that found a
positive correlation between increased female representation on
corporate boards and firm performance, as well as discuss why these
studies are of particular importance to companies. Third, this section
will discuss positive correlations to firm performance not only
through included financial performance and shareholder value, but
also board productivity, corporate social responsibility (CSR),
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) initiatives, and
increased female representation in executive leadership.
A number of studies have found negative correlation or no
correlation between board diversity and firm performance and, as a
result, undermines companies’ efforts to maximize shareholder
value. 13 For example, one study found that boards which did not
maintain an egalitarian board culture would not realize the benefits
of socially and professionally diverse boards, while those that did
experienced the positive effects more strongly. 14 Boards were more
likely to maintain egalitarian culture if they maintained higher
proportions of independent directors and institutional investors. 15
The finding where boards that lacked egalitarian principles were less
likely to experience the benefits of increased female representation on
corporate boards does not diminish the value of gender diversity, but
simply adds another consideration that must be handled in the
pursuit towards gender parity on corporate boards. In order for
companies to obtain the value from increased female representation,
companies must foster a culture that promotes diversity of opinion
and values various perspectives equally. Another study found that
as female representation on corporate boards increased, the market
value of those companies decreased; companies that had been
recognized through higher rankings for their organizations’ diversity
practices were the companies most impacted by the decrease in

13. Stephanie J. Creary, Mary-Hunter (“Mae”) McDonnell, Sakshi Ghai & Jared Scruggs,
When and Why Diversity Improves Your Board’s Performance, HARV. BUS. REV. (March 27,
2019), https://hbr.org/2019/03/when-and-why-diversity-improves-your-boards-performance.
14. Id.
15. Yannick Thams, Bari L. Bendell & Siri Terjesen, Explaining women’s presence on
corporate boards: The institutionalization of progressive gender-related policies, 86 J OF BUS.
RESEARCH SEC. 5. 130, 135,138 (2018).
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market value. 16 As was the case with the other study, the results do
not suggest that investors do not believe women serving as board
members is an obstruction of shareholder value, “but that the firm,
by choosing to appoint women directors, is prioritizing diversity”
and therefore “deprioritizing shareholder value maximization.” 17
Gender diversification of corporate boards positively impacts a
company’s financial performance. One of the most cited studies was
conducted by Credit Suisse Research Institute, which issued a report
in August 2012 analyzing the relationship between gender diversity
on corporate boards and financial performance of 2,360 companies
around the world from 2005 to 2011. 18 Companies with one or more
female directors on their boards delivered higher average returns on
equity and growth than those with no women on the board. 19 Fortune
500 companies maintaining female representation on their boards
were found to have even higher performance statistics than those
with no female directors. 20 Notably, Fortune 500 companies with
gender-diverse boards experienced an average of 84% improvement
on return on sales, 60% improvement on return on capital, and 46%
improvement on return on equity. 21 The inclusion of at least one
woman on a board has led to 40% fewer financial restatements. 22
Recently, one study found that companies with increased female
representation have delivered better returns with lower volatility,
compared to their more-homogenous peers. 23
Though the evidence that increased gender representation on
corporate boards leads to good financial outcomes is mixed, it is clear
that board diversity leads to other outcomes, which are known to lead
16. Isabelle Solal & Kaisa Snellman, Women Don’t Mean Business? Gender Penalty in Board
Composition, 2 (INSEAD Working Paper No. 2019/20/OBH, 2019).
17. Kim Elsesser, Increasing Diversity And Profits? Investors Think Companies Can’t Do
Both, FORBES (July 20, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kimelsesser/2020/07/20/increasingdiversity-and-profits-investors-think-companies-cant-do-both/?sh=45950c4022bc
(quoting
Isabelle Solal).
18. Katherine W. Phillips, How Diversity Makes Us Smarter, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Oct. 1,
2014), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-diversity-makes-us-smarter/.
19. Id.
20. Why Women on Boards?, BOARDBOUND BY WOMEN’S LEADERSHIP FOUNDATION,
https://womensleadershipfoundation.org/add-women-boards-directors (last visited Oct. 24, 2020).
21. The Bottom Line: Corporate Performance and Women’s Representation on Boards
(2004-2008), CATALYST 1,1 (2011).
22. Lawrence J. Abbott, Susan Parker &Theresa J. Presley, Female Board Presence and the
Likelihood of Financial Restatement, 26 ACCOUNTING HORIZONS 607, 620 (2012).
23. Why It Pays to Invest in Gender Diversity, MORGAN STANLEY, (May 11, 2016),
https://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/gender-diversity-investment-framework.
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to good financial performance. A number of studies suggest that
investing in environmental, social, and governance (ESG) initiatives
has had a positive effect on a company’s financial market
performance. 24 Studies lend support to the notion that corporations
will benefit from the addition of female directors and the
maintenance of a diversified board. Research findings suggest female
directors positively impact various aspects of the corporation,
including financial performance and shareholder value, corporate
social responsibility (CSR), corporate governance, and board
productivity; these studies support the business case for increased
female representation on corporate boards.
Companies, through the maintenance of gender-diverse boards,
may reduce groupthink and, therefore, increase board productivity. 25
Groupthink, a psychological phenomenon where cohesive groups
reach a consensus in which the “strivings for unanimity override their
motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action,”
may be reduced by increasing female representation on corporate
boards. 26 Homogenous boards, or those lacking gender parity, may
fall victim to groupthink, putting the company at greater risk and
reducing board productivity; to mitigate the risks associated with
groupthink, studies recommend the addition and maintenance of
female directors, who are less susceptible to groupthink and are
generally better able to recognize the needs and interests of different
stakeholder groups. 27
Corporations with women on boards experienced increases in
corporate social responsibility and improved reputations. 28 Deutsche
Bank conducted one of the most comprehensive reviews on this
subject in 2012, and found that all of the academic studies in Deutsche
Bank’s examinations indicated that organizations with higher ESG
and CSR standards had “a lower cost of capital in terms of debt (loans
and bonds) and equity.” 29 The report concluded these higher
24. Charles Mitchell et al., The Business Case for Corporate Investment in Sustainable
Practices, THE CONFERENCE BOARD 1, 3 (2016).
25. Eunjung Hyun, Daegyu Yang, Hojin Jung & Kihoon Hong, Women on Boards and
Corporate Social Responsibility 1, 9 (2016); Paul’t Hart, Irving L. Janis’ Victims of Groupthink,
12 POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 247, 256 (1991).
26. Hart, supra note 25, at 256.
27. Maretno Harjoto, Indrarini Laksmana & Robert Lee, Board Diversity and Corporate
Social Responsibility, 132(4) J BUS. ETHICS 641, 650 (2015).
28. Hyun et al., supra note 25, at 2.
29. Mitchell et al., supra note 24, at 3.
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standards are tantamount to lower risk and are “rewarded by capital
These findings refute the prior assumption that
markets.” 30
maximizing shareholder value and CSR initiatives are not cohesive,
and even suggest a positive correlation between the two. Increasing
female representation on corporate boards may result in higher levels
of CSG and subsequently increase shareholder value. Additionally,
companies maintaining female representation on their boards
experienced fewer “governance-related controversies, such as
bribery, corruption, fraud, and shareholder battles.” 31
The relationship between gender diversification of corporate
boards and that of executive leadership also positively impact
profitability and value creation. One study found that corporations
ranked in the top 25% in regard to gender diversification among
executive leadership teams are more likely to outperform other
companies on profitability by 21% and value creation by 27%. 32
Alternatively, companies “pay a price for lacking diversity” – in
regard to gender and ethnic/cultural diversity, the bottom 25% of
companies were 29% less likely to experience profitability above the
industry average. 33 Another found a strong correlation between
women in the C-suite and firm profitability. 34 “A profitable firm at
which 30% of leaders are women could expect to add more than 1
percentage point to its net margin compared with an otherwise
similar firm with no female leaders.” 35 When the study was
conducted in 2016, the standard profitable firm’s net margin observed
in the sample was 6.4% and, therefore, a 1 percentage point increase
would result in a 15% increase in firm profitability. 36 These studies
are consistent with other findings made by organizations such as
Catalyst and McKinsey, demonstrating that consultants, another
major player in the corporate governance space, agree that board

30. Id.
31. Linda-Eling Lee, Ric Marshall, Damion Rallis & Matt Moscardi, Women on Boards:
Global Trends in Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards, MSCI INC. 1, 6 (2015).
32. Vivian Hunt, Lareina Yee, Sara Prince & Sundiatu Dixon-Fyle, Delivering Through
Diversity, MCKINSEY & CO. (2018).
33. Id. at 9.
34. Marcus Noland, Tyler Moran & Barbara Kotschwar, Is Gender Diversity Profitable?
Evidence from a Global Survey (Peterson Institute for International Economics, Working Paper 163, 2016).
35. Id. at 8-9.
36. Id.
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diversity is an issue of importance and worth advocating for. 37
Analysis of the S&P 1500, which accounts for almost 90% of the
overall U.S stock market capitalization, over a twelve-year period,
found that increasing female representation on corporate boards led
to increases in representation of women in companies’ top
management positions. 38 Additionally, the increase in female
representation at the executive level will positively impact the pool
of women qualified to hold board positions. One of the factors
considered when reviewing potential director nominees is prior CEO
and CFO experience; two thirds of newly appointed directors have
prior or current CEO or CFO experience. 39 Increasing female
representation in executive positions may subsequently increase the
qualified pool of potential female board member nominees.
Though some of the evidence is mixed, major players, including
shareholders, consultants, academics, and the SEC staff, support the
general understanding that gender diversity benefits companies.
Despite the mounting evidence of the business benefits companies
gain from having female representation on their boards, companies
have only made slow and incremental progress to diversify.
Consequently, policymakers and advocates have stepped in to
advance the cause of gender parity. The next Section outlines three
policy solutions utilized by various stakeholders that increased
female representation on corporate boards in light of the
shortcomings of each.

IV. POLICY MECHANISMS, LITIGATION, AND
EXTERNALLY-IMPOSED REQUIREMENTS ARE NOT
EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES TO INCREASE BOARD
GENDER DIVERSITY
Several policy solutions have been articulated and proposed to
further advance the cause of gender parity on corporate boards, but
37. AARON A. DHIR, CHALLENGING BOARDROOM HOMOGENEITY: CORPORATE LAW,
GOVERNANCE, AND DIVERSITY 32 (2015) (citing Diana Bilimoria, “The Relationship between
Women Corporate Directors and Women Corporate Officers” (2006) 18:1 J. OF MANAGERIAL
ISSUES 47 at 57 (“The findings of this study empirically support the notion that women corporate

board directors and top management gender diversity are positively related.”).
38. David A. Matsa & Amalia R. Miller, Chipping Away at the Glass Ceiling: Gender
Spillovers in Corporate Leadership, AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROC., 1, 2,7 (2011).
39. Bonnie W. Gwin, Chief Executive Officer & Board of Directors, Trends in Board
Composition Over the Past Five Years, HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, Oct. 2015, at A2.
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they all have significant limitations. First, this section will discuss the
ineffectiveness of the Security and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s)
policy requiring disclosure of a board’s diversity considerations as
they relate to the nomination of directors. Additionally, this section
will discuss the use of shareholder derivative suits and the
shortcomings of this approach due to the safe harbor protections
afforded to board members. The section will then highlight the
legislative steps California and Washington have taken to promote
equitable gender representation and review the issues relating to the
constitutionality of the legislation as well as other potential
consequences.

A. ITEM 407(C)(2)(VI)
The SEC maintains diversity disclosure requirements, in which
companies that consider diversity in director nominations must
disclose how and in what way diversity is considered. 40 If a company
considers diversity characteristics, Item 407(c)(2)(vi) requires the
company to describe the ways in which the board implements the
diversity considerations in identifying director nominations. 41 The
motivations behind the disclosure were to promote diversity and
transparency relating to the governance practices of a company, key
issues identified by not only shareholders, but also consultants,
academics, and corporate insiders. 42 It was believed that such
disclosure would enable investors to make “informed voting and
investment decisions.” 43
Though well-intentioned, the discretion provides the board with
a number of ways to circumvent the disclosure requirements. First,
the SEC does not define the term “diversity,” enabling each
individual company to draft and utilize its own interpretation of
diversity. For example, some have defined the term diversity to
include gender, race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation, while others
have utilized a broader approach, defining diversity as differences in
40. 17 C.F.R. § 229.407 (2020).
41. SEC Compliance & Disclosure Interpretations, Question 116.11 (Sept. 21, 2020).
42. Public Statement, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Shareholders Need Robust
Disclosure to Exercise Their Voting Rights as Investors and Owners (Feb. 20, 2013) (on file with
author).
43. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, Securities Act Release No. 33-9089; 34-61175; IC29092; File No. S7-13-09, 38 (Feb. 10, 2010).
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perspective, professional experience, and education. 44 Additionally,
the SEC knew investors were “particularly interested in board
policies regarding gender and/or racial diversity,” yet still permitted
companies to define the term, excluding those characteristics.
Finally, a corporation may have poor intentions, and, in order to
avoid the disclosure requirement altogether, a nominating committee
may simply elect to not consider diversity under any circumstance in
the director nomination process. This thwarts the SEC’s original
intent in establishing this rule and results in a lack of information
available to investors in order to make informed decisions. This
result was an unforeseen consequence of the rule that further
demonstrates the ineffectiveness of Item 407(c)(2)(vi) as a successful
tool to increase female representation on corporate boards. The
diversity disclosure requirements obligating companies to disclose
whether, and if so how, diversity characteristics are considered in the
director nomination process is not an effective means of promoting
gender diversity on corporate boards and should not be relied upon
as such a mechanism.

B. SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE SUITS
Directors of a corporate board are obligated to perform their
duties with the “amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent
men would use in similar circumstances.” 45 A shareholder or
shareholder group may, on behalf of the corporation, file a
shareholder derivative action against a corporate officer for breach of
a fiduciary duty. 46 It has been argued that directors have a fiduciary
duty to their shareholders to diversify the board, and therefore, are
subject to liability if one or more members of the board violates this
duty in some way. 47 Some have encouraged shareholders to file
derivative suits against directors of companies maintaining a
homogenous board for violating their fiduciary duty of care owed to
the shareholders of the company. 48 Promoters of this approach argue
44. Id. at 38-39.
45. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 749 (2005).
46. Derivative Action, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
47. Mary Parmeter, Comment, The Fiduciary Duty to Gender Diversify Within Corporate
Boards: The Necessary Link Among Shareholder Primacy, The Director Nomination Process, and
Higher Financial Return, 32 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 85, 98 (2017).
48. Id. at 100
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that directors who purposefully sidestep female director candidates
or intentionally ignore the studies’ findings by failing to include
qualified female candidates throughout the director nomination
process have violated their fiduciary duty of care. 49
There have been a number of derivative suits filed against the
directors and officers of corporations including Oracle Corporation
(Oracle), Facebook, Inc., and Qualcomm, Inc., claiming, among other
things, breach of fiduciary duty for lack of board diversity.
Specifically, the complaint against Oracle further claims that the
company’s failure to diversify has caused “severe financial and
reputational damage to Oracle.” 50
Here, the use of shareholder derivative suits faces significant
obstacles and limitations. Delaware, where more than half of all
publicly traded corporations are incorporated, provides two types of
safe harbors for fiduciaries, the business judgment rule, a rebuttable
presumption of good faith, 51 and the exculpatory provision provided
for in Delaware Code Annotated title 8, 102(b)(7). 52
Under the business judgment rule, it is presumed that a
corporation’s directors, in making business decisions, act in good
faith, on an informed basis, and in the honest belief that such act is in
the best interest of the corporation. 53 The fact that the judicial system
is not in the best position to assess business decisions, as well as the
role hindsight bias may play in the court’s assessment of such
decisions, supports the presumption established by the rule. 54
In the case of director nominations, it seems unlikely that a court
would find a breach of fiduciary duty because of the court’s emphasis
on process, rather than outcomes, where hindsight bias can impact
one’s rationale and decision. Shareholders would be required to
demonstrate a lack of good faith in nominating a male director
candidate or a lack of good faith in not selecting a female director
candidate. A corporation, in response to such a claim, would
49. Id. at 104
50. Complaint at 10, Klein v. Ellison, (N.D. Cal. 2020) (No. 3:20-cv-04439).
51. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 124 (2009).
52. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102 (2020).
53. In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 124.
54. Id. (“Hindsight bias is the tendency for people with knowledge of an outcome to
exaggerate the extent to which they believe that outcome could have been predicted.” Hal R. Arkes
& Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. The Business Judgment Rule: Differences in
Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REV. 587, 587 (1994). In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig.,
964 A.2d 106, 124 n.50 (Del. Ch. 2009).).
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acknowledge that in selecting the male director candidate to join the
board, the corporation’s directors believed they were acting in the
best interests of the company. It would be incredibly difficult for the
shareholders to prove that a company’s board of directors acted in
bad faith when, in the end, the board selected a qualified candidate,
even if that director candidate is male. For the foregoing reasons, the
business judgment rule creates a steep uphill battle for shareholders
to demonstrate directors have breached their fiduciary duty for
failing to diversify their boards.
The exculpatory provision provided for in Section 102(b)(7) of
the Delaware General Corporation Law, which may be adopted as
part of a company’s certificate of incorporation, provides a separate
barrier for derivative suits. Section 102(b)(7) alleviates directors of
liability for monetary damages resulting from breaches of the duty of
care. 55 More than forty other states have adopted similar provisions;
one sample found that by 1990, more than 90% of public companies
had adopted such provisions. 56 Plaintiffs to duty of care shareholder
derivative suits are limited by Section 102(b)(7) because it further
narrows the scope of claims to those non-exculpated by the
provision. 57
These protections afforded to fiduciaries, and the courts’
deference to such protections, drastically constrict the impact and
effectiveness such derivative suits could potentially have in
promoting board diversity and, therefore, is not an efficient approach
to improve female representation on corporate boards.

C. STATE LEGISLATION
The use of state legislation to increase female representation on
corporate boards is another policy solution proposed and
implemented in some jurisdictions, including California. This
subsection will first address the advances made under the California
statute. Second, this subsection will explain the broad consensus as to
why the California statute and similar legislation is unconstitutional.
Third, this subsection will acknowledge that, while there has yet to
55. 8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7) (2020).
56. WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW
OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 246 (2016); Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the
Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J. 1155, 1160-61 (1990).
57. Allen et al., supra note 56 at 124-25.
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be a successful challenge to date, the law’s position is precarious and
thus should not be relied on as the sole mechanism for increasing
gender diversity on corporate boards.
To promote equitable representation of corporate boards, the
California legislature passed SB 826 requiring public companies to
maintain a requisite number of women on their board of directors. 58
The state of Washington passed a similar law, Senate Bill 6037 (SB
6037), in March of 2020. 59 To be in compliance with SB 826 and SB
6037, public companies subject to the laws must maintain genderdiverse boards sufficient to satisfy the gender quota requirements set
by the respective laws. 60 Failure to comply with the SB 826 results in
a minimum fine of $100,000. 61 Alternatively, SB 6037 provides for a
less fiscally burdensome solution; if a company does not maintain a
gender-diverse board, the organization must provide shareholders
with information relating to the company’s diversity policies and
procedures. 62 SB 826 and SB 6037 embody legislation utilized
overseas in western European countries such as France, Norway, and
Spain. 63
Though SB 826 led to a dramatic increase in female
representation on corporate boards, imperfections in the law and
questions as to the law’s constitutionality hinder its overall
effectiveness and usefulness as a long-term tactic to achieve gender
parity. SB 826 resulted in one of the largest surge’s in female
representation on corporate boards. One study analyzed the board
composition of 488 California companies that filed proxy statements
from January 2019 to July 2019. 64 These companies exhibited a 23%
increase in female representation on corporate boards, with women
obtaining 143 board seats. 65 The authors of this study also found that
pre-SB 826, 188 of the 650 firms headquartered in California did not
have any female members on their boards, but by December 31, 2019,
58. Cal. Stat. S.B. 826 (2018).
59. Wash. Stat. S.B. 6037 (2020).
60. Cal. Stat. S.B. 826 (2018); Wash. Stat. S.B. 6037 (2020).
61. Cal. Stat. S.B. 826 (2018).
62. Wash. Stat. S.B. 6037 (2020).
63. Douglas M. Branson, Women on Boards of Directors: A Global Snapshot 1 (Univ. of
Pittsburg Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 2011-05, 2011),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1762615.
64. Daniel Greene, Vincent Intintoli & Kathleen M. Kahle, Do Board Gender Quotas Affect
Firm Value? Evidence from California Senate Bill No. 826, 60 J. OF CORP. FIN. 1, 3 (2019).
65. Id.
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that number decreased to 21. 66 Notably, seven of the companies with
homogenous male boards moved their principal places of business
outside the state of California. 67
While the passage of SB 826 led to a surge in female
representation on corporate boards, the law was immediately
challenged. Though a later decision to strike down a law will not
necessarily reverse the gains obtained in the surge, it may
disincentivize other states, especially those with company-friendly
legislation where many companies are incorporated, to adopt similar
legislation, and therefore negatively impacts use of the law as a longterm strategy to reach gender parity. 68 The creation of an express
gender classification likely violates the Equal Protection Clause of
both the California Constitution and the United States Constitution.
Additionally, the fact the law is applicable to corporations
headquartered in California but incorporated in another state calls
into question the validity of the law on Commerce Clause grounds,
which was at issue in VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen
(VantagePoint). In VantagePoint, the Delaware Supreme Court
determined that the application of a California Corporate Code
provision to a Delaware corporation violated the Commerce Clause
of the United States Constitution reasoning that California “has no
interest in regulating the internal affairs of foreign corporations.” 69
This same reasoning can be utilized to hold SB 826 unconstitutional.
Since SB 826 was passed, a number of claims have been filed, but
there has yet to be a successful challenge to the gender quota law. In
Meland v. Padilla, a shareholder plaintiff brought suit alleging the law
violated the Equal Protection Clause by impairing his shareholder
rights to vote on the board of directors. 70 The Eastern District of
California dismissed without prejudice the suit for plaintiff’s lack of
standing to pursue the claim. 71 Since SB 826 obligated the
66. Keith Bishop & Allen Matkins, Academicians Find Firms With All Male Boards Have
Left The State, JDSUPRA (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/academicians-findfirms-with-all-male-69387/.
67. Id.
68. Joseph A. Grundfest, Mandating Gender Diversity in the Corporate Boardroom: The
Inevitable Failure of California’s SB 826, 6-7 (Rock Center for Corporate Governance., Working
Paper Series No. 232, 2018).
69. VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1113 (Del. 2005),
(quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., (1988) 457 U.S. 624, 645-46, 73 L. Ed. 2d 269, 102 S. Ct. 2629).
70. Motion to Dismiss at 1, Meland v. Padilla, (E.D. Cal. 2020) (No. 2:19-cv-02288-JAMAC).
71. Id. at 13.
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corporation, rather than its shareholders, the court determined that
the shareholder’s voting rights were in fact not impaired by the law. 72
Plaintiff has appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 73 If the
district court’s decision remains, corporations, rather than
shareholders, may still challenge SB 826 on other grounds; 74 a
company has yet to file such a claim and there is little guidance as to
whether or not one will in the future.
Even if SB 826 and SB 6037 were held to be constitutional, the
success of gender quota laws has been questioned and debated.
Other countries have enacted similar gender quota laws applicable to
public corporations. Though well-intentioned, an unanticipated
result of such legislation was that public corporations circumvented
the law through a change of incorporation, relocation, or dissolution;
companies were also more likely to incorporate as private firms
rather than public firms. 75 Norway, the first to enact such a law, has
been classified by some as a failure, as well as a cautionary tale to
states passing similar legislation. 76 There, public companies must
comply with a quota law requiring that, at a minimum, 40% of the
corporation’s director positions be held by women. 77 When the
Norwegian government initially enacted a quota law in 2003, it was
applicable to a subset of companies, including those that were stateowned or chartered as a result of special legislation. 78 Norway
anticipated broadening the scope of the law soon after it initially
passed and began taking the necessary steps. In 2005, a transitional
period was provided to existing public companies in order to achieve
the quota requirements; immediate compliance was required,
however, for newly incorporated public companies. 79 Though

72. Id. at 12.
73. Appeal of Petitioner, Meland v. Padilla, , (E.D. Cal. 2020) (No. 2:19-cv-02288-JAM-AC).
74. William Savitt, Ryan A. McLeod & Anitha Reddy, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz,
Federal District Court Dismissal of Challenge to Board Diversity Statute, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (April 24, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/04/24/federaldistrict-court-dismissal-of-challenge-to-board-diversity-statute/.
75. Dhir, supra note 37, at 104.
76. Valerie Richardson, California moves toward corporate gender quotas, ignoring
TIMES
(Sept.
4,
2018),
Norway’s
failure,
WASHINGTON
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/sep/4/california-eyes-corporate-gender-quotasdespite-no/; Kenneth R. Ahern & Amy K. Dittmar, The Changing of the Boards: The Impact on
Firm Valuation of Mandated Female Board Representation, 127(1) Q. J. OF ECON. (2012).
77. Dhir, supra note 37, at 73.
78. Id. at 104.
79. Id. at 105.
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conformity by all applicable companies was achieved, data suggests
companies circumvented the law through relocation, change of
incorporation, or dissolution. 80 In 2003, the number of public
companies in Norway began to decline while the number of private
companies increased. 81 By 2009, the number of public companies,
which were subject to the quota law, decreased by more than 70%. 82
Conversely, the number of private companies, which are not required
to conform to the quota law, increased by 30%. 83 Notably,
employment was increasing during this period, except in 2009,
signifying an upward economic trend. Based on this information,
researchers suggested that, following the announcement of the
gender quota law, companies were more likely to incorporate as
private firms as opposed to public firms. 84 The same study also
suggested that companies with no female directors, those most
affected by the law, circumvented its application by a change in
incorporation. 85 These unanticipated consequences demonstrate the
ways in which companies were able to circumvent the applicability
of the gender quota laws and avoid penalties for failure to comply.
Gender quota laws are often implemented as a remedy to
increase female representation and to right the wrongs associated
with the prior discriminatory hiring methods, but some have argued
that while these programs are well-intentioned, they can negatively
impact those sought to be benefited by such practices. Data lends
support to the assertion that preferential selection, the heightened
weight given to “work-irrelevant” characteristics such as gender and
race, can negatively impact a woman’s self-assessment. 86
Alternatively, those selected for a position based solely on merit did
not experience this reduction in self-esteem. 87 Based on these
findings, SB 826 and SB 6037 may foster an environment in which
female directors, elected after the passage of the respective state laws,
would be devalued by colleagues and create a lack of self-esteem in
80. Ahern, supra note 76, at 1.
81. Id. at 30-31.
82. Id. at 30.
83. Id. at 30-31.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 31.
86. Madeline E. Heilman, Michael C. Simon & David P. Repper, Intentionally Favored,
Unintentionally Harmed? Impact of Self-Based Preferential Selection on Self-Perceptions and SelfEsteem, 72(1) J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 62, 62 (1987).
87. Id.
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these women. Similarly, one of the drawbacks associated with
gender quota laws is the fear of instilling a “token woman” mentality,
causing further harm and reducing the benefits to be experienced by
a corporation for maintaining a diverse board. Studies have
demonstrated that our culture perceives leadership positions to be
more masculine in character and that, as a result, the respective
societal stereotypes of men and women influence our depiction of
who will be most fit for such positions. Based on these stereotypes,
women are often thought of as maintaining “far fewer of the qualities
that comprise effective leadership skills than do men.” 88 Studies
suggest that when gender-based preferential selection is a factor, the
common perception is that other factors, such as competence, did not
greatly influence the decision. 89 Consequently, this may generate a
“vicious cycle of negative self-regard for women targeted for favored
treatment.” 90 Even if a woman would have been selected for a
position based on her skills and qualifications, this cycle may still take
place.” 91 Studies suggest that women chosen based on their gender,
rather than merit, perceived themselves as maintaining inadequate
basic leadership skills, and were more likely to minimize the role they
played in successful outcomes, as they, “rated their performance
more negatively . . . and were less eager to persist in their leadership
roles.” 92
The significant limitations maintained by the various policy
solutions evaluated above exemplify the need for an alternative
approach to increase board gender diversity.

V. SHAREHOLDER PARTICIPATION IS AN
ALTERNATIVE APPROACH THAT SHOULD BE
UTILIZED TO ADDRESS BOARD GENDER DIVERSITY
Shareholders should seek to influence management through the
vehicles of director election and other types of shareholder
resolutions to promote increased female representation on corporate
88. I. K. Broverman, S. R. Vogel, D. M. Broverman, F. E. Clarkson & P. S. Rosenkrantz,
Sex‐Role Stereotypes: A Current Appraisal1. Journal of Social Issues, 28: 59-78.
doi:10.1111/j.1540-4560.1972.tb00018.x (1972); Heilman et al., supra note 86 at 62.
89. Heilman et al., supra note 86 at 62.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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boards. First, this section will discuss the various tools available to
shareholders and how they should be employed. Second, this section
will discuss the prerequisites, and potential barriers, shareholders
exercising this power must satisfy and ways in which these
requirements can be overcome. Third, this section will examine two
prior examples of a shareholder’s use of the proxy process to include
a shareholder director candidate on the proxy and the lessons to be
learned from each scenario. Fourth, this section will discuss other
tools available to shareholders to increase female representation on
corporate boards outside of shareholder participation in director
elections through proxy access, including pressures from institutional
investors and recommendations to implement other diversity
provisions to the company’s bylaws.

A. NOMINATION
SHAREHOLDERS

OF

QUALIFIED FEMALE DIRECTORS

BY

This section argues in favor of an alternative approach,
promoting gender diversification of corporate boards through the
proxy process and other corporate governance tools at shareholders’
disposal, rather than through externally imposed requirements or
litigation.
The proxy process enables shareholders to affect
meaningful change to the company. Once a corporation adopts a
proxy access provision into its bylaws, shareholders meeting certain
thresholds may submit director nominees to be included in the
corporation’s proxy. Shareholders should utilize proxy access to
nominate director candidates to diversify boards, compel companies
to have board members commit to more equitable gender
representation, and submit proposals recommending the adoption
and implementation of policies promoting gender equity. Notably,
these recommendations transect with current discourse regarding the
shareholder voice in the proxy process, illustrating the importance of
robust shareholder access to the proxy.

B. PROXY ACCESS PREREQUISITES
Rule 14a-8 provides public company shareholders with a
relatively cost-efficient forum to express themselves in regard to a
wide variety of issues of significance to shareholders, including
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corporate governance matters. Shareholder proposals have played
an instrumental role in inciting change in corporations’ selfgovernance mechanisms and general operations. Proxy access, a rule
enabling shareholders to nominate candidates on the corporation’s
proxy, is a pivotal aspect of the shareholders’ ability to meaningfully
exercise their voting power. In order to gain proxy access, a provision
must be adopted in the corporation’s bylaws granting shareholders
proxy access.
One way in which proxy access is obtained is via shareholder
proposal to gain such access. “SEC Rule 14a-8 (Rule 14a-8) addresses
when a company must include a shareholder’s proposal in its proxy
statement and identify the proposal in its form of proxy when the
company holds an annual or special meeting of shareholders.” 93 Rule
14a-8 requires the inclusion of shareholder proposals amending, or
requesting an amendment to, either of the company’s governing
documents, the Certificate of Incorporation and the bylaws, relating
to director nomination procedures or disclosure provisions, provided
such proposals do not otherwise conflict with SEC proxy rules or
applicable law. 94 These changes enable shareholders to submit
proposals establishing or recommending the establishment of proxy
access and, therefore, allow shareholders to diversify the board. 95
Previously, companies wanting to exclude shareholder proxy
access proposals from the company proxy utilized Rule 14a-8(i)(9),
which enables companies to exclude shareholder proposals that
conflict with a company’s proposal. 96 The SEC addressed this issue
in the following case, clarifying the scope of Rule 14a-8(i)(9), which
benefits shareholders. Whole Foods Market, Inc. (Whole Foods)
sought to exclude a shareholder proposal that, if passed, would have
allowed an individual shareholder or shareholder group holding 3%
of Whole Foods shares for at least three years to submit up to two
director candidates on the corporate proxy in 2014. 97 Though Whole
93. 17 CFR § 240. 14a-8 (2020).
94. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Facilitating Shareholder Director
Nominations, Release Nos. 33-9136; 34-62764 (2010).
95. Bloomberg Law, Corporate Practice Portfolio Series, Corporate Governance Portfolios,
Portfolio 83-3rd: Shareholder Proposals, Detailed Analysis, Introduction and History, G. Role of
the
Rule
in
Spurring
Corporate
Governance
Change,
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/corporate/cp_home/document/2910179880.
96. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020).
97. Whole Foods Market, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, Response of the Office of Chief
Counsel (Dec. 1, 2014).
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Foods had not yet drafted a shareholder proxy access proposal of its
own at the time of receipt, the company drafted such a proposal with
more stringent standards, requiring a shareholder or shareholder
group to maintain at least 9% of company stock for at least five years
to be eligible to include director nominees on the company’s proxy. 98
Whole Foods claimed the shareholder proposal and the proposal
endorsed by Whole Foods “directly conflict,” and if both were to be
included on the proxy it “would present alternative and conflicting
decisions for the stockholders” creating “the potential for inconsistent
and ambiguous results.” 99 The SEC issued a no-action letter stating
they would not recommend enforcement action against Whole Foods
for the omission of the shareholder proposal based on this reasoning
proffered by Whole Foods. 100
The SEC later retracted the Whole Foods no-action letter and
published a staff legal bulletin articulating a narrower interpretation
of the exclusion’s applicability. 101 A shareholder proposal would no
longer be perceived as “directly conflicting with the management
proposal if a reasonable shareholder, although possibly preferring
one proposal over the other, could logically vote for both.” 102 The
staff legal bulletin then hypothecated an example similar to that of
Whole Foods, stating that since both proposals seek to achieve “a
similar objective, to give shareholders the ability to include their
nominees for director alongside management’s nominees in the
proxy statement, and the proposals do not present shareholders with
conflicting decisions such that a reasonable shareholder could not
logically vote in favor of both proposals,” and therefore does not fall
within the scope of Rule 14a-8(i)(9). 103
The SEC’s retraction of the Whole Foods no-action letter and
publication of the staff legal bulletin clarifying the scope of Rule 14a8(i)(9) has provided shareholders with the opportunity to ensure the
requisite standards to be met by shareholders to submit proposals is
not overly burdensome. This has the effect of promoting shareholder
proposals to gain proxy access. Consequently, a greater number of
shareholders, by gaining access to the proxy through such
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id.
Id.
SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14H (CF), Shareholder Proposals (Oct. 22, 2015).
Id.
Id.
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shareholder proposals, will have the opportunity to submit such
proposals to promote female director candidates for election to a
company’s board.
Shareholders must satisfy certain requirements in order to
submit a proposal. In September 2020, the SEC voted on and adopted
amendments to modernize the shareholder proposal rule; the
amendments eliminated the 1% threshold and amended the
requirement with the addition of the following three thresholds:
continuous ownership of at least $2,000 for at least 3 years,
continuous ownership of at least $15,000 for at least 2 years, or
continuous ownership of at least $25,000 for at least 1 year. 104
These amendments change the rule that governs the process for
shareholder proposals to be included in a company’s proxy
statement. 105 Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 requires publicly traded
companies under SEC regulation to include shareholder proposals in
their proxy materials, with a few exceptions. 106 A shareholder or
shareholder group is now required to hold a minimum of $2,000
worth of shares for at least three years. The amendments require the
shares to be held for at least three years in order to demonstrate longterm investment in the company. 107 The “one proposal” rule has also
been updated to clarify that multiple proposals cannot be submitted
by a single shareholder at the same shareholder’s meeting on behalf
of other shareholders. 108
The SEC’s justifications for adopting these amendments were to
ensure that shareholder proposals included in the company’s proxy,
“and thus draw on company resources . . . to command the time and
attention of the company and other shareholders,” consider the
interests of all shareholders who bear the associated costs of
“reviewing, considering, and voting on such proposals.” 109 The SEC
had determined that five individual shareholders accounted for 78%
of all shareholder proposals and, therefore, adjustments needed to be

104. Press Release, SEC, SEC Proposes Amendments to Modernize Shareholder Proposal
Rule (Nov. 5, 2019) (on file with author); Press Release SEC, SEC Adopts Amendments to
Modernize Shareholder Proposal Rule (Sept. 23, 2020).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Amendments to Modernize Shareholder Proposal Rule
(Sept 23, 2020).
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made to address the benefits and burdens of such actions. 110 It seems
as though these amendments are meant to decrease the number of
proposals from low-stakes shareholders looking to accomplish their
niche agendas, while preserving “the ability of small, medium- and
long-term shareholders to continue to enter and engage in the
shareholder process,” so long as such claims were aimed at creating
long-term value. 111 As demonstrated by the previously discussed
findings, increased female representation on corporate boards is
correlated to a number of outcomes that results in better firm
performance, and arguably long-term value. Finally, the SEC Chair
articulated that the amendments would foster proponent-issuer
engagement sooner, 112 which may also result in fruitful conversations
relating to increased female representation on corporate boards and
achieving gender parity. While these recently adopted amendments
did heighten the standards shareholders must satisfy in order to
submit a proposal, they do not appear to substantially thwart a
shareholder or shareholder group’s objective in proxy access and
director nominations.

C. PRIOR CASES OF SHAREHOLDER PARTICIPATION
DIRECTOR NOMINATION PROCESS

IN THE

The adoption of proxy access bylaws has skyrocketed in recent
years. At the end of 2019, 76% of S&P 500 companies’ bylaws
included a proxy access provision, compared to less than 1% in
2014. 113 Companies generally limit a shareholder’s ability to utilize
proxy access to nominate the candidates through the bylaws. The
most common terms are known as the “3/3/20/20 provision.” 114 The
provision permits a shareholder owning, at a minimum, 3% of shares
of the company for three years to put forward nominees equating up
110. Public Statement, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Statement at Open Meeting
on Proposals to Enhance the Accuracy, Transparency, and Effectiveness of Our Proxy Voting
System (Nov. 5, 2019) (on file with author).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Holly J. Gregory, Rebecca Grapsas & Claire Holland, Proxy Access: A Five-Year Review,
L.
SCH.
FORUM
ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
(Feb.
4,
2020),
HARV.
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/02/04/proxy-access-a-five-year-review/.
114. Stephen T. Giove, Arielle L. Katzman & Daniel Yao, Proxy Access Proposals, HARV. L.
SCH.
FORUM
ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
(Oct.
19,
2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/10/19/proxy-access-proposals-2/.
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to 20% of the number of seats on the board, or at least two directors. 115
In the case of shareholder groups, the maximum number of
shareholders able to aggregate their holdings to satisfy the requisite
threshold is twenty. 116 While shareholder access to the proxy has
drastically increased, shareholders have made little use of these
provisions. With only two cases exemplifying the use of proxy access
to nominate directors, there is little guidance on what tactics work
effectively to ensure a shareholder-nominated candidate will meet
the requirements set in the bylaws of a company. In the first instance,
an institutional investor’s proposal was not in compliance with the
company’s bylaws and, as a result, was not included in the
company’s proxy materials. 117 In the second instance, the shareholder
proposal was included in the proxy materials and resulted in the
election of the shareholder nominee. 118
The first attempt to utilize the proxy access process was made by
GAMCO Asset Management Inc. and Gabelli Funds, LLC
(collectively, GAMCO) to nominate a director candidate to the
National Fuel Gas Company (National Fuel) board of directors in
2017. 119 GAMCO is made up of entities affiliated with activist
investor Mario Gabelli. 120 The National Fuel board of directors
reviewed the letters submitted by GAMCO to determine whether the
nomination was in compliance with the company’s bylaws relating to
shareholder nominations of director candidates. 121
The board found that GAMCO had not complied, and would not
be able to comply, with the terms set forth in the bylaws. 122 The key
parameters of National Fuel’s proxy access provision mirrored the

115. Id.
116. See Id.; The Latest on Proxy Access, Sidley Update app. B at B-86 (2019),
https://www.sidley.com/-/media/update-pdfs/2019/01/AppendixB.pdf?la=en.
117. Letter to GAMCO Asset Management Inc. from National Fuel Gas Co., Exhibit 99,
Schedule
14N
(Nov.
23,
2016),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/70145/000119312516776709/d296488dex99.htm.
118. The
Joint
Corp.,
Schedule
14N
(Dec.
27,
2018),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1351443/000092189518003391/sc14n12021002_12272
018.htm.
119. National
Fuel
Gas
Co.,
Schedule
14N
(Nov.
10,
2016),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/70145/000092189516006095/sc14n05867018_1110201
6.htm.
120. The Latest on Proxy Access, Sidley Update app. B at B-86 (2019),
https://www.sidley.com/-/media/update-pdfs/2019/01/AppendixB.pdf?la=en.
121. Supra note 117.
122. Id.
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“3/3/20/20 provision.” 123 Satisfaction of the “3/3/20/20 provision”
is not determinative in each case; here, GAMCO had owned greater
than 3% of National Fuel’s shares for more than three years, yet still
was unable to meet the requirements set forth in the proxy access
provision.
Other requirements may be articulated in a company’s
governing documents, further limiting a shareholder or shareholder
group’s ability to include a director candidate in the proxy materials.
One of the representations to be made by a National Fuel shareholder
seeking to use the proxy access provision is that the shareholder did
not obtain the requisite number of shares with the “intent to change
or influence the company,” but “in the ordinary course of
business.” 124 The board denied GAMCO’s nomination because they
had failed on two counts. 125 First, after review of GAMCO’s filings
under Section 13(d), the board opined that GAMCO’s previous and
current conduct demonstrated an intent to “change or influence the
company” in acquiring the requisite number of shares, and therefore
was not able to utilize the proxy access provision to nominate a
director candidate. 126
Second, GAMCO, through the use of a shareholder proposal,
requested National Fuel to consider spinning-off a segment of its
operations into a stand-alone entity. 127 While this proposal received
17.8% support, National Fuel did not pursue this recommendation. 128
Consequently, GAMCO repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with
National Fuel’s decision and articulated its own desire to “split up
the company,” resulting in the board’s determination that GAMCO
maintained “a current intent to change or influence control of the
Corporation.” 129
GAMCO’s attempted use of shareholder proxy access to
nominate a director candidate demonstrates one of the ways in which
a company may deny a proposal based on the issuer’s governing
documents, such as the certificate of incorporation or bylaws. While
123. The Latest on Proxy Access, Sidley Update app. B at B-86 (2019),
https://www.sidley.com/-/media/update-pdfs/2019/01/AppendixB.pdf?la=en; Giove supra note
114, at B-46.
124. Giove supra note 114, at B-46.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Sidley Update, supra note 114, at B-86
128. Id.
129. Supra note 117.
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GAMCO’s proposal was unsuccessful, National Fuel’s letter to
GAMCO, as an institutional investor, demonstrated a commitment to
maintaining shareholder proxy access and the board’s belief that
shareholder(s) should have access to the proxy in this way if in
compliance with the bylaws. 130 The letter further stated the adoption
of proxy access was motivated in part by the significance the board
and company as a whole place on their relationships with
shareholders. 131 Novel approaches to resolve an issue are not
successful from the get-go; it is a process of trial and error. Those
wanting to put forth a director candidate must utilize the knowledge
gained from prior successes, as well as the failures, in order to make
progress. The lesson, and cautionary tale, established in GAMCO is
that it is vital to ensure the shareholder putting forth a director
candidate to include on the proxy is able to meet the requirements set
forth in the company’s governing documents, or else such submission
will likely be excluded from the proxy for the shareholder(s) failure
to comply. GAMCO’s attempt is instructive and a useful source of
information for future shareholders wishing to participate in the
director nomination process and highlights the importance of
understanding the threshold requirements that must be met by
shareholders.
In contrast, the second use of proxy access resulted in a
successful outcome. On December 27, 2018, the Austin Trust, in
compliance with the proxy access bylaws of The Joint Corporation
(The Joint Corp.), nominated Glenn Krevlin for election to the board
of directors of the company. 132 Similar to National Fuel’s proxy access
bylaw, a portion of The Joint Corp.’s proxy access requirements
resembled a “3/3/20/20 provision.” 133 According to the Form 8-K
submitted by The Joint Corp., Krevlin was one of seven members
elected to the board of directors, receiving over 99% of votes cast in
favor of election. 134 Krevlin received 7,373,369 votes in favor of
election with only 950 votes against, receiving more “yes votes” than
two of the other elected directors. 135 Krevlin received 630,276 more

130. Id.
131. Id.
132. The Joint Corp. supra note 118 at 1-3.
133. Sidley Update, supra note 116, at B-86.
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Joint
Corp.,
Form
8-K
(May
31,
2019),
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votes than James Amos Jr. and 1,542,044 more votes than Ronald
DaVella. 136 The director who received the most yes votes beat Krevlin
by only 37,854 votes. 137
The Austin Trust success gives shareholders hope that a
shareholder’s use of proxy access can impact real change at the board
level, but some relevant facts may have contributed to its success.
Steven Colmar, trustee of The Austin Trust, had significant ties to The
Joint Corp. Notably, Colmar co-founded The Joint Corp. and served
on the company’s board of directors with his brother, Craig, until his
resignation in 2017. 138 Craig Colmar also is the Secretary of the
company. 139 These connections may have impacted the willingness
of the issuer to be amenable to The Austin Trust’s nomination and are
therefore relevant here. Regardless of the familial relationship, The
Austin Trust’s successful proposal is instructive, exemplifying
shareholder compliance with a company’s bylaws and resulting in
the inclusion of such proposal in the company’s proxy materials.
These two cases provide instructive guidance as to how eligible
shareholders may wish to formulate proposals and take advantage of
the opportunity to proactively increase gender-diversity of corporate
boards. The nomination of directors by shareholders through proxy
access is an economical method for eligible shareholders to nominate
candidates to boards, creating a credible threat to current board
members that may incentivize increased communications with their
shareholders. 140 With the use of proxy access, a shareholder or
shareholder group may nominate a qualified female candidate to the
board, increasing board diversity. Submitting such proposals,
regardless of if they come to a vote, will communicate to the board
that gender parity is a key issue to the company’s stakeholders.

D. EVEN WITHOUT THE USE OF SHAREHOLDER-NOMINATED
DIRECTORS, SHAREHOLDERS SHOULD UTILIZE OTHER FORUMS
TO INCREASE FEMALE REPRESENTATION ON CORPORATE
BOARDS.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. The
Joint
Corp.,
Form
S-1
at
60-1
(Sept.
19,
2014),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1612630/000114420414056976/v389460_s1.htm.
139. The Joint Corp., supra note 118 at 1-3.
140. Michael Barzuza, Proxy Access for Board Diversity, 99 BOS. U. L.R. 1279, 1289-90
(2019).

432

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

17:2

While the adoption of proxy access provisions has steadily
increased, there are a number of companies in which shareholders are
unable to submit director nominations due to lack of access to the
proxy. Shareholders, including institutional investors, may compel
companies to commit to more equitable gender representation and
submit proposals recommending the adoption and implementation
of provisions that support increased female representation on
corporate boards, without putting forward a specific candidate.
Institutional investors, such as Blackrock, hold sway with
corporations and may set expectations and guidelines for companies
they have invested in. 141 In regard to board composition, Blackrock
emphasizes the importance of board diversity, articulating that if the
firm believes an issuer has not sufficiently increased board diversity,
it may result in the firm voting “against the nominating/governance
committee for an apparent lack of commitment to board
effectiveness.” 142 This forum enables shareholders to express their
dissatisfaction with the nominating and governance committees’
members and further pressures these directors to consider increasing
gender diversity.
State Street Global Advisors (SSGA) has also provided guidance
for boards to encourage the facilitation and maintenance of greater
female representation in their companies and organizations. 143 SSGA
first addresses current practices and biases thwarting the increase of
female representation on corporate boards, citing issues such as
requiring director nominees to have CEO experience and the
overwhelming reliance on existing networks for director nominees. 144
SSGA highlights six steps directors should follow to promote gender
diversity of corporate boards. 145 Boards of directors are encouraged
to: (1) evaluate the company’s current status in regard to gender
diversity on both the board and management levels, (2) set goals to
141. Corporate Governance and Proxy Voting Guidelines for U.S. Securities, BLACKROCK
INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP 1, 5-6 (2020), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/factsheet/blk-responsible-investment-guidelines-us.pdf.
142. Id.
143. SSGA Asset Stewardship, State Street Global Advisors’ Guidance on Enhancing Gender
Diversity
on
Boards,
SSGA
Asset
Stewardship
Vol.
1,
1
(2020),
https://www.ssga.com/content/dam/ssmp/library-content/products/esg/guidance-on-enhancinggender-diversity-on-boards.pdf.
144. Id. at 2.
145. Id. at 4.
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heighten female representation at these senior levels, (3) identify
directors and members of senior management to actively promote
and support these goals, (4) acknowledge the biases associated with
the director nomination process and work to prevent such biases
from interfering, (5) nominate and consider women for board and
senior management positions, and (6) communicate transparently
with shareholders and describe the steps taken by the board to
address the issue of gender diversity. 146
Institutional investors have also submitted shareholder
proposals urging companies to implement a Rooney Rule, a provision
that was first implemented by the National Football League; this
provision requires teams to interview “at least one minority
candidate for any open head coaching or general manager
position.” 147
CtW Investment Group submitted a shareholder proposal
recommending the adoption of a Rooney Rule at Amazon, which if
implemented, would require the “initial list of candidates from which
new management-supported director nominees are chosen should
include (but need not be limited to) qualified women and minority
candidates.” 148 Initially, the shareholder proposal was not supported
by Amazon’s board of directors, emphasizing that Amazon’s current
methods for the recruitment and evaluation of board candidates
reflected the company’s commitment to diversity. 149 After the release
of the proxy statements expressing Amazon’s opposition to the
shareholder proposal, the company experienced significant backlash,
with employees and other stakeholders questioning Amazon’s
commitment. 150 At the time the proposal was submitted, the
corporate governance guidelines stated “‘the Nominating and
Corporate Governance Committee . . . seeks out candidates with a
diversity of experience and perspectives,’” 151 yet the two most recent
additions to the board are white men who were recommended by
146. Id.
147. Letter from CtW Investment Group to Amazon Shareholders (April 27, 2018)
https://www.iccr.org/sites/default/files/page_attachments/amazon_shareholder_letter_4-2718.pdf.
148. Id.
149. Amazon.com
Inc.,
Schedule
14A
(April
19,
2018),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1018724/000119312519102995/d667736ddef14a.htm
150. Free and Fair Markets Initiative, Amazon’s Unfair Deal of the Day: Undercutting women.
And their wages., 5 (2018).
151. Id. at 5.
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current members of the board. 152 Amazon’s adoption of the Rooney
Rule provision can be utilized as an example to shareholders,
demonstrating the effective use of a shareholder proposal to direct
the board members’ attention to a key-issue important not only to
shareholders, but other stakeholders as well. The examples above
demonstrate the sway institutional investors hold with companies
who tend to be more receptive to the investors’ proposals and
recommendations. Since institutional investors may be better
situated to make such recommendations and hold greater influence
over corporations, these alternative solutions are more efficient and
effective mediums that can affect real change and increase female
representation on corporate boards.

VI. CONCLUSION
Gender diversity of corporate boards has developed into a
sizeable concern for corporate boards, with various stakeholders
expressing a keen interest in increasing female representation. While
a number of policy solutions have been suggested and utilized to
advance this cause, such as the use of SEC disclosure requirements,
shareholder derivative suits, and the passage of state legislation, they
are accompanied by significant limitations, calling into question the
effectiveness of such approaches. Shareholders have the unique
opportunity to actively promote gender diversity and increase female
representation on corporate boards through a number of forums,
including the nomination of director candidates to be included on the
company’s proxy, institutional investors placing pressures on
companies to diversify, and recommending the adoption of
provisions such as the Rooney Rule. Shareholder participation in the
director nomination process is a better and more effective strategy to
accomplish the goal of increased female representation on corporate
boards and should be utilized to a greater extent by shareholders
meeting the requisite standards.

152. Letter from CtW Investment Group to Amazon Shareholders, supra note 147.

